Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 2

Article 1

5-1-1986

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.: Judicial Step or
Stumble?
Garrick J. Hodge

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Garrick J. Hodge, Note, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.: Judicial Step or Stumble?, 6 N. Ill.
U. L. Rev. 409 (1986).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.: Judicial Step or Stumble?
I.

INTRODUCTION

By conservative estimates, three per cent of annual births or over
6 million persons in the United States are mentally retarded.' Who
these people are and on what basis they may be classified as mentally
retarded remains the subject of much debate and controversy. 2 The
American Association on Mental Deficiency provides the most com-

monly accepted definition of mental retardation:

Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period.'
Given this definition as a basis for classification, subaverage intellectual functioning and impaired adaptive behavior are two criteria that
must exist together before a person may be considered mentally
I. G. TARAN, S. WRIGHT, R. EYmAN, C. KEERAN NATIONAL HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION: SOME ASPECTS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
MENTAL

DEFICIENCY, 369-79. (1973).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMrIrEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION: Mental RetardationPast
and Present 143 (1977) (The definition of mental retardation is ". . . a culmination
of long debate and revision, and may well be modified in the future.") P. Ross,
I LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED Basic Facts About Mental Retardation, 19-20 (1973) ("[T]here are many definitions of mental retardation .... [It]
..is not a simple entity. It refers to the result of a multitude of possible conditions .... ") P. HEINTZ, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION, Mental Retardation335
(Deighton, L.C., ed. 1971) ("Much confusion has been generated by the various
definitions of mental retardation .... At least 23 formal systems for classifying mental retardation ... have been used. . . .") (citing GELOF, Comparison of Systems of
Classification Relating Degree of Retardation to Measured Intelligence, 68 AM. J.
OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY 297-317 (1963)).
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 2 at 143.
See also GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 824 (Blakiston's 4th ed. 1979) for a definition
of mental retardation:
Subnormal intellectual functioning, often present since birth or apparent
in early life; may be primary (thereditary or familial), without demonstrable
organic brain lesion or known prenatal cause, or secondary, due to brain
tissue anomalies, chromosomal disorder, prenatal, maternal, or postnatally
acquired infections, intoxication or. trauma, prematurity, disorders of growth,
nutrition, or metabolism, degenerative diseases, tumor, or following major
psychiatric disorders or associated with psychosocial (environmental) deprivation; classified as borderline, mild, moderate, severe, and profound.
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retarded." The classification of an individual as mentally retarded
creates negative social perceptions.' These negative perceptions about
the mentally retarded result from a mentally retarded individual's inability to perform at a level of adaptive and intellectual expectations
which society sets for an individual in relation to his peers.6 Failure
4.

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION,

supra note 2, at 143

(The American Association on Mental Deficiency identifies mental retardation with
subnormality in two behavioral dimensions, intelligence and social adaptation,
occurring before age 18). HEINTZ, P., supra note 2, at 336 (The American Association on Mental Deficiency's definition of mental retardation makes it clear that
subaverage intellectual functioning must be accompanied by impairment in adaptive
behavior).
Intellectual functioning is measured by standardized intelligence tests and is
considered subaverage when the obtained intelligence quotient (IQ) is greater than
one standard deviation below the population mean of the particular age group involved. (See Table 1.)
Table I.

Terms and Ranges in IQ scores for Degrees of Retardation
Level of Corresponding Corresponding Old Terms
Deviation
Range in
in Wechsler
for Level
in Measured Stanford Binet IQ (S.D. = 15) of Function
Intelligence
IQ Score
(S.D. = 16)

Current Terms
for Level of
Function

Range in
Standard
Deviation
Value

BORDERLINE
MILD

-1.01 to -2.00
-2.01 to -3.00

-1
-2

83-68
67-52

84-70
69-55

Borderline
Moron

MODERATE

-3.01 to -4.00

-3

51-36

54-40

SEVERE

-4.01 to 5.00

-4

35-20

39-25

-5.01

-5

20

25

Imbecile
(trainable)
Imbecile
(trainable)
Idiot

PROFOUND

This chart represents a composite taken from:
RETARDATION,

(educable)

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL

supra note 2 at 146, P. Roos supra note 2 at 20, and P.

supra note 2 at 335,

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION,

HEINTZ,

supra note

2, at 154.
. 5. The attachment of a label to a species of plant or a type of rock makes
no difference to the plant or the rock. The label assigned to classify a human
being does make a difference. To label a person mentally retarded has consequences of a psychological nature if the person is cognizant of it and
can assign a meaning to it; it has consequences of a social nature insofar
as other persons assign meaning and respond in terms of that meaning.
This is especially the case with the label of "mentally retarded" because
all terms associated with deficiency of intelligence are, in our culture, highly
charged with negative values.
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION,

6. See id. at 147.

supra note 2, at 154.
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to conform to these expectations and other esteemed cultural attributes
leads to the fictitious assumption that mentally retarded persons are
less "human" than others, resulting in oppressive treatment of the
mentally retarded based on that assumption.' In order to affirm the
humanity of the mentally retarded minority, in the United States,
negative social perceptions should be recognized as a dominant force
behind the prejudicial treatment of the mentally retarded and the denial
of their basic rights and privileges.
The United States Supreme Court recently had an opportunity
to dispel negative social perceptions and to affirm the humanity of
the mentally retarded. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court decided whether mentally
retarded persons are a "quasi-suspect" class and therefore deserving
of "intermediate" or "heightened" scrutiny for purposes of equal
protection analysis. The Court's decision that mentally retarded persons should not be treated as a quasi-suspect class may be viewed
as a puzzling departure from intermediate or heightened scrutiny equal
protection precedents. This decision may also be viewed as a step
toward the development of a unitary standard of equal protection
which may in the future be applied to all challenges to legislative
classifications under the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.'
This note shall first present a short overview of the
traditional
equal protection analysis necessary to understand the question of
whether mentally retarded persons should be treated as a quasi-suspect
class. The City of Cleburne decision will then be reviewed in order
to present the courts' differing applications of equal protection analysis
to that question. Next, two basic criticisms of the Court's majority
opinion will be introduced. In discussing the implications of City of
Cleburne, it will be suggested that this decision may have further
fragmented equal protection analysis and may impede progressive
judicial treatment of the mentally retarded and other groups. Finally,
Justice Stevens' proposed unitary standard is considered as a compromise and future solution to what seems to be an otherwise uneven
equal protection analysis.

7. See P. Roos, supra note 2 at 19 ("Failure to conform to such highly valued
cultural attributes as intelligence, self-sufficiency and physical attractiveness underlies
the implicit assumption that some individuals are less 'human' than others. [Tihose
who are intellectually deficient . . . must struggle desparately to obtain even the
most basic of society's services.").
8. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).

9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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II.

TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION

ANALYSIS:

AN OVERVIEW

The United States Supreme Court has applied various standards"0
of judicial review in testing the constitutional validity of state legislative
classifications challenged under the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. These standards of review, however, are
generally categorized as minimal or rational scrutiny, strict scrutiny,
and intermediate or heightened scrutiny, listed and discussed here in
their respective order of historical development."
Minimal scrutiny is a standard of judicial review that allows
legislators much flexibility." The minimal scrutiny test is usually applied
10. These standards of judicial review are in some cases extremely difficult
to identify and categorize, as evidenced by the decision of the Supreme Court in
City of Cleburne. Professor Gunther has pointed out that modern equal protection
analysis is "in flux," that "gropings for new formulations by all wings of the Burger
Court make for less clear doctrine," and that "varieties of intermediate levels of
scrutiny have surfaced." See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 591 (11th ed. 1985). These standards of review are presented in this note in
three general categories so that the reader may acquire a general understanding of
traditional equal protection analysis. An interesting analysis of the complex judicial
responses of the Burger Court has been presented by Dean Strickman who categorizes
the various standards of equal protection analysis as: (1) minimum rationality; (2)
strict rationality; (3) low-intermediate scrutiny; (4) high-intermediate scrutiny; and.
(5) strict scrutiny. See Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 22 B.C.L.
REv. 935, 937-49 (1981).
11. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 586-91.
12. See City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3254 (citing United States Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976)). When applying a minimal scrutiny or rational basis standard of
review, "[tihe rules by which [an equal protection challenge] must be tested . . .
are these:
1. The equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and
therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis
does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3.
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4.
One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, it is essentially
arbitrary.
Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
See generally Note, Constitutional Law- The Rational Basis Test Becomes Less
Rational, 4 W. NEW ENO. L. Rnv. 429 (1982) (examines inconsistencies in the Supreme
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by the Court when the challenged legislative classification appears in
social or economic legislation." The minimal scrutiny, or rational basis
test, does not require that a statute contain logical consistency" or
correctness." In this analysis the Court adopts the view that the
political remedy of voting will remove undesirable laws"1 and that
in many situations judicial intervention must give way to legislative
experimentation." If the legislation is "rationally related to a legitimate
Court's application of the minimal scrutiny or rational basis test). See, Gulf, C.
& S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897), and Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v.
Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251, 263 (1935) (cases in which the Court gave deference to
legislative judgment; not concerned with the accuracy of the legislative finding, but
only with the question of whether the classification so lacks reasonable basis as to
be arbitrary).
13. "In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution. . .

."

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (citing Lindsley

v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)). See also, Allied Stores of
Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (these cases indicate that if any state of
facts could reasonably be conceived that would sustain the legislative classification,
they must be assumed to exist at the time the law is enacted). See generally, Tussman
and TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344-53
(1949) (for an in depth discussion of concepts involved in a "reasonable"
classification).
14. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) .'[Mhe problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific."' (citing Metropolis Theater
Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913)); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("But the law need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional.")
15. "But States are not required to convince the courts of the corrections of
their legislative judgments." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
464 (1981).
16. "The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy,
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and
that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may
think a political branch has acted." Vance, 440 U.S. at 97 (footnote omitted). See
United States Railroad Retirement Bd, 449 U.S. at 179 and n. 12.
17. New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303-04 (1976).
In short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom
or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither
affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines . . . in the local

economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary
act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. See McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 270. "We do not wish to inhibit . . .experimental

classifications in a practical and troublesome area, but inquire only whether the
challenged distinction rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose."

414
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state interest," then the legislation is generally presumed to be valid."
The Supreme Court has recognized that some legislative classifications must be subject to a closer analysis in order to defend values
of liberty and equality found in the Constitution.'9 This analysis, or
strict scrutiny, was first used to invalidate statutes that discriminated

against black persons and other racial minorities.2"

Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of judicial review2 and is
applied by the Court when one of two characteristics are present in
the challenged legislative classification. When the classification impermissibly interferes with either (1) the exercise of a fundamental
'3
right 22 or (2) operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class,
18. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTUnONAL LAW, 524 (1978).
'Minimum scrutiny has been described as, "minimum scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact." G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 588 (citing Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972)).
19. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONA . LAW, § 16-6, at 1000 (1978).
20. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odius
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.")
See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-09 (1880).
21. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 18, at 524. Strict
Scrutiny has been described as,," 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact ... ." G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 588 (citing Gunther Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REV. i (1972)).

22. Fundamental rights are those which are explicitly or implicitly protected
by the Constitution. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 30,
33-34 (1973). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely private
nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right to custody of one's children); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (use of contraceptives by unmarried persons); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (right to access to courts to obtain a divorce); Breen v.
Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969) (right to wear hair as one pleases protected
by first amendment penumbras), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969) (right to private possession of obscene material); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (right to associate and to cast votes effectively protected by the
first amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives by married persons); Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
23. Suspect classes are those which the Court finds inherently suspect because
they encompass discreet and insular minorities for which close judicial solicitude is
appropriate to protect that class from the adverse affects of a majoritarian political
system. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The historical justifica-

tion for the suspect classification analysis can be traced to Justice Stone's famous
footnote four:

1986:4091

CITY OF CLEBURNE

then strict scrutiny is applied.2 4 The Court then requires that the state
prove that the classification is suitably tailored to further a "compelling state interest," or it will be found to be in violation of the
Constitution.25
The concept of "suspect" classifications is an aspect of traditional equal protection analysis relevant to the discussion of mentally
retarded persons as a "quasi-suspect" classification. The Supreme
Court has elaborated a series of interrelated standards to aid in determining if certain groups are especially vulnerable to invidious treatment and are therefore deserving of greater protection. 6 If a class
is determined suspect for puirposes of equal protection analysis, it will
"command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." 27
Generally, the Court considers the following relevant indicia to

[Liegislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation [may] be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
[S]imilar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities ...

prejudice against discrete

and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to 'protect minorities, and which may call for correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938) (citations
omitted). Suspect classes have been held to be those groups defined on the basis
of race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), alienage, see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971), and national origin, see, e.g., Herhandez v. Texas 347 U.S.
475 (1954).
24. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). See
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). (The Court treats legislation that disadvantages a suspect class or impinges upon the exercise of a fundamental right as
presumptively invidious).
25. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249,
3255 (1985) (citing, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, (1982) (classifications that disadvantage a suspect class or impinge upon the exercise of a fundamental right must be shown to be precisely tailored to serve a compelling state interest);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (classifications that restrict or penalize
the exercise of fundamental rights are in violation of the Constitution unless necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest).
26. Brief for Respondents at 28, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
27. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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determine whether a class is suspect: " (1) classes saddled with
disabilities or subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
(2) classes relegated to a position of political powerlessness,2 9 (3) classes
subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities, 3" and (4) classes
with immutable attributes that distinguish the class. 3'
When the Court applies intermediate or heightened scrutiny, 2 it
examines legislative classifications more closely than minimum scrutiny
28. Widin, Suspect Classification:A Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK L. REV. 407,
at 413-14 (1983). (These indicia include: (1) a class history of unequal treatment;
(2) immutability of the trait that distinguishes the class; (3) present political power
lessness; and (4) stereotyped class characteristics unrelated to the class' abilities that
result in unique disabilities). For a short presentation of cases containing nuances
of the "indicia of suspectness." See id. at 413 n. 45.
29. San Antonio, supra note 22 at 28.
30. Massachusetts Bd. Of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per
curiam). (A Massachusetts statute requiring'mandatory retirement for uniformed state
police officers who reached the age of 50 was held not to deny equal protection
of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment).
31. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (plurality opinion). (Statutory
Constitutional validity may be undermined when a state has enacted legislation creating
classes based upon immutable human attributes other than race) (citing, e.g., Oyama
v. California 332 U.S. 633 (national origin); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(alienage); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(gender)). See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 n. 14 (1982). ("Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice later than legislative
rationality .... Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by
virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste'
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish").
32. Professor Gunther, supra note 10 at 591, indicates that in the 1980s there
is ample basis for the "widespread and justified charge that the modern Court's
exercise of equal protection review has been erratic." Id. In particular, it is difficult
to discern when the application of intermediate scrutiny may be appropriate. See
Note, Application of Intermediate Scruting Standard, Hinges on "Importance" of
Rights Affected, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 347 (1985):
"No clear test ... exists to guide the courts in deciding when to apply the
intermediate ... scrutiny standard." Id. at 347. The United States Supreme

Court's use of an intermediate standard of equal protection review has been
sporadic, and the Court has offered little guidance on the circumstances
warranting ...

the intermediate level of scrutiny."

Id. at 357; Note, Alternative Models of Equal Protection Analysis: Plyler v. Doe,
24 B.C.L. REV. 1363, 1374, 1379 (1983) "Despite the growing body of precedent
employing an intermediate standard of review, the Court has applied that standard
erratically. The Court has not articulated a principled theory of when such scrutiny
will be considered appropriate." Id. at 1379; Wildin, supra note 28 at 428 (1983)
"[L]ittle insight illuminates the reasoning that makes one class suspect and
another nonsuspect. While rights may be amorphous concepts, the judicially
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but not as closely as the strict scrutiny standard. Intermediate scrutiny
is applied by the Court when important, though not fundamental,

rights are involved," or where there is a sensitive, although not suspect,

legislative classification"' (a quasi-suspect classification"). In these cases,
the court requires that the legislative classification serve important
governmental objectives and that it be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives, or it will be found to be in violation
of the Constitution. 6

created method of evaluating them should not employ amorphous constructs
such as 'suspect classification.' [W]hen the Court determines whether a class
is suspect, it merely states the conclusion without providing any significant,
supporting analysis ....The Supreme Court's decisions have left unclear the
precise criteria that determine quasi-suspect status. This ambiguity has
prevented lower courts from labeling all arguably deserving groups as quasisuspect classes."
Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90
YALE L.J. 912 (1982).
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three
Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 978-79 (1975) (The criteria
for identifying suspectness have not been applied consistently).
33. L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 16-31, at 1089-90, 1090 nn. 1 & 3 (1978) Intermediate scrutiny is applied where "important though not necessarily 'fundamental' or 'preferred' interests are at stake." Id. (citing, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 652 (1972) (father's interest in retaining custody of his biological children); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (individual's interest in continued possession
of driver's license)).
34. L. TRME, supra note 19, § 16-31, at 1090. Intermediate scrutiny is applied
where a sensitive, although not suspect, classification has been employed. Tribe suggests that intermediate scrutiny has been applied to classifications based on gender,
id. §§ 16-25, 16-26, at 1063-70; alienage, id. § 16-22, at 1052-56; and illegitimacy,
id. § 16-23, at 1057-60.
35. The Supreme Court has determined that the quasi-suspect classes of gender,
see, e.g., Craign v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), and illegitimacy, see, e.g., Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 762-67 (1977), have called for an intermediate or heightened
standard of review.
(The classification of alienage was once given a strict scrutiny standard of review,
see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), but the Court has since
applied the intermediate standard of review, see, e.g., Roley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291, 294 (1978); Compare, Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1979), an alienage
case which applied only a rational basis standard. Note, Alternative Models of Equal
Protection Analysis: Plyler v. Doe, 24 B. C. L. REv. 1363-1397, at 1378 (1983)).
Cf., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (The
Supreme Court has declined to extend heightened review to differential treatment
based on age); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (The Supreme Court has declined
to extend heightened review to classifications based on wealth).
36. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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IIl.

CITY OF

LEBURNE V. CLEBURNE LIWNG CENTER,

INc.

The suit in City of Cleburne, arose out of a zoning dispute between the City of Cleburne, Texas, and the Cleburne Living Center,

Inc. (hereinafter "CLC")." CLC had leased a home in a Cleburne area

zoned by the City as "R3" '3 for high density residential uses.39 The home
was to be used by CLC as a group home for thirteen mentally retarded
individuals who would be under constant supervision of CLC staff members.4
The City informed CLC that a "special use permit'" 4 ' was required for the operation of a group home and CLC submitted a permit application.42 The City further informed CLC that the special
use permit, renewable annually, was required for hospitals for the
insane or feeble-minded, alcoholics or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions' 3 and that the group home should be classified
as a "hospital for the feeble-minded."""
37. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., is a Texas corporation whose purpose is the
establishment and operation of group homes for persons who are mentally retarded.
Brief for Respondents at 2, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
38. Section 8 of Cleburne's zoning ordinance listed the permitted uses in a
district zoned R3 as:
1. Any use permitted in District R2.
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging houses.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes, or homes for convalescents or
aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts.
7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is
carried on as a business.
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal institutions.
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses . . .
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 193-94 (1984) (citing
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, No. CA 3-80-1576-F, slip op.
at 4, finding 12). [sic] See infra note 46.
39. Brief for Respondents at 2, City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center,
Inc.,- 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
40. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne LIving Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249, at 3252
(1985).
41. Section 16, subdivision 9, of Cleburne's zoning ordinance requires that
special use permits be obtained for hospitals for the insane or feeble minded, or
alcoholics or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions. (Cleburne Living
center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, at 194 (1984) (citing Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, No. CA 3-80-1576-F, slip. op. at 5, Finding 13)).
42. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3252-53.
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Motivated primarily by the fact that the residents of the home
would be persons who were mentally retarded, the City Council voted
to deny the special use permit."' As a consequence of this use classification, the group home was not a permitted use, despite the fact that
the City did not require special use permits for "apartment houses,
multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority
houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing
homes for convalescents or the aged (other than for the insane or
feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and other specified uses."" 6
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT

The District Court stated that Cleburne insisted on a special permit for the CLC group home and denied CLC that permit because
the group home would be a facility for the mentally retarded."' The
District Court found that if the potential residents of the CLC home
were not mentally retarded, but were the same in all other respects,
its use would be permitted under the ordinance."
Despite these findings, the District Court held the ordinance and
its application constitutional, applying the minimum level of judicial
scrutiny.' 9 The District Court found that the legislative classification
did not involve a fundamental right, and that mental retardation was
not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, which would make the use of
strict or intermediate scrutiny inappropriate in the District Court's
analysis.5 0 The ordinance was considered rationally related to the City's
legitimate interests in the safety and fears of neighbors and the number
of people to be housed in the group home. 5 '
B.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of Appeals-for
ing that important rights were
that mental retardation was a
of intermediate scrutiny.5" The

the Fifth Circuit reversed, determindenied to the mentally retarded and
quasi-suspect classification deserving
Court of Appeals found a very im-

45. Id. at 3253. (The District Court
tion for the city council's decision was the
were mentally retarded).
46. Id. at 3258-59. See supra note
47. Id. at 3253.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., v.

explicitly stated that the primary motivafact that the future residents of the home
38.

City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 191 (1984).
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portant though not fundamental right denied because, "the exclusion

of group homes from Cleburne operates to prevent mentally retarded

persons from assimilating into and contributing to their society...." 3
Mental retardation was found a quasi-suspect classification by
the Court of Appeals due to a combination of three factors."' First,

mentally retarded persons have been "subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment,"" and, "[d]iscrimination against

the mentally retarded is likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice." 5 6
Second, as a result of historical exclusion from the political process,
mentally retarded persons have lacked political power." Third, mental retardation is immutable." Applying intermediate scrutiny, the
Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was unconstitutional, both

on its face and as applied to CLC, because it did not substantially
further any important governmental interests."

53. Id. at 199.
54. Id. at 198.
55. Id. at 197. "Until the 1970s [the mentally retarded] . . . were universally
denied admittance into public schools in the United States. In addition, the Eugenic
Society of America fought during the first half of this century to have retarded persons eradicated entirely through euthanasia and compulsory sterilization." Id. (citing
Pennsylvania Assoc. of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 294
(E.D. Pa. 1972)).
"[Thirty-two states have had statutes providing for the sterilization of retarded
individuals." Id. (citing Pennsylvania Assoc. of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279, 294 n.42 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp.
946, 959 n.9 (E.D.Pa. 1975); O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J.
30 (1956); see also, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (upholding Virginia compulsory sterilization law)).
Mentally retarded individuals "have been segregated in remote, stigmatizing
institutions . . . and when permitted in society, they have often been subject to
ridicule." Id. (citations omitted).
56. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 197. (Various "forms of mistreatment
have perpetuated the historical misunderstanding of mental retardation and led to
popular fears and uncertainty. The Cleburne ordinance discriminates between the
mentally retarded and other groups-e.g. the elderly-that also require supervision
but may establish group homes in the R-3 district without a special use permit."
Distinctions such as these are likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice).
57. Id. at 197-98. (As of 1979, most states disqualified mentally retarded individuals from voting) (citing Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88
YALE L. J. 1644 (1979)). See, Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 163 n.35 (3d
Cir. 1981) (en banc) ("The retarded cannot vote in most states and, with few community ties, sponsors or friends, have minimal impact on the political process.")

(citing J.

ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST,

135-79 (1980).

58. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 198. "Doctor Phillip Roos explained at trial
that mental retardation is 'irreversible.' 'There may be some amelioration, but to
date it is not a curable condition.' Trial Transcript at 139."
59. Id. at 200.
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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated
in part the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.60
The Supreme Court's majority held that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class deserving
of intermediate scrutiny-' The Court's majority offered four reasons
for denying mentally retarded persons quasi-suspect classification
status. 62 First, the state's interest in dealing with and providing for
the mentally retarded is legitimate because mentally retarded people
have a decreased ability to cope with and adapt to day to day living
and are immutably different from others in relevant aspects.63 Second,
a distinctive national and state legislative response demonstrates that
"lawmakers have been addressing [the] difficulties [of the mentally
retarded] in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice
and a corresponding need for

. .

. " intermediate scrutiny.6" Govern-

mental considerations of the differences of mentally retarded persons
"in the vast majority of situations is not only legitimate, but

Id.

The City claimed that the objectives of the statute were:
(1) to avoid undue concentrations of population; (2) to lessen congestion
in the streets; (3) to ensure safety from fire and other dangers; and (4)
to protect the health, safety and welfare of the City's population-in particular (a) to protect the serenity of the existing neighborhoods, (b) to protect neighbors from harm; and (c) to protect the mental retardates themselves
by providing an appropriate living environment.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit systematically discounts each of
these objectives as irrelevant and weak stating that the City did not prove a substantial relationship between the goal and the ordinance.
The reasons the City gave for denying CLC the special use permit were:
(a) the attitude of a majority of owners' of property located within two
hundred (200) feet of . . . [the site]; (b) the location of a junior high across
the street from . . . [the site]; (c) concern for the fears of elderly residents
of the neighborhood; (d) the size of the home and the number of people
to be housed; (e) concern over the legal responsibility of CLC for any actions
which the mentally retarded residents might take; (f) the home's location
on a five hundred (500) year flood plain; and (g) in general, the presentation [CLC] made before the City Council.
Id. at 202 (citing Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, No. CA 3-80-1576-F,
slip op. at 9-10, Finding 34). The Court of Appeals discounted these reasons as well,
calling them, "ambiguous," "unsupported," "not sufficiently important," and
"strained." Id.
60. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252 (White, J., writing for the majority).
61. Id. at 3251.
62. Id. at 3255-58.
63. Id. at 3256.
64. Id.
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desireable."' Third, the legislative response, which exists only with
public support, "negates any claim that the mentally retarded are
politically powerless." 66 Fourth, if the "large and amorphous" class
of mentally retarded persons were given quasi-suspect status, "it would
be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other
" such as, "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill,
groups ...
67
and the infirm."
Because they found that neither a quasi-suspect class nor a fundamental right was involved, the majority also held that the appropriate
standard of judicial review for legislation that distinguishes between
8
the mentally retarded and others is a rational basis standard.
However, unlike the District Court which applied a traditional
minimum scrutiny or rational basis standard, the majority, applying
their own version of a rational basis standard found that the ordinance
was unconstitutional because as applied it did not rationally relate
9
to a legitimate governmental purpose.
IV.

CRITICISMS

There are two basic criticisms of the majority opinion in this
case. These two basic criticisms and others are given by Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun join, con0
curring in part and dissenting in part, in City of Cleburne." The first
is that the majority's justifications, as to why mentally retarded people
do not warrant an express heightened judicial scrutiny, are not supported by heightened scrutiny precedents and will not withstand logical
analysis."'
The Court's majority reasoned that the immutable differences of
the mentally retarded are relevant to some legislative classifications,
and the state's interest is therefore legitimate."' However, this reason
has not been used previously to deny a quasi-suspect classification
and the resulting application of intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate
or heightened scrutiny is considered appropriate in areas such as
gender, illegitimacy, or alienage 3 because the court views the trait
65. Id. at 3257.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3257-58.
68. Id. at 3258.

69. Id. at 3260.

70. Id. at 3263-3275 (Marshall, J., with whom Brennan and Blackmun, J.J.,
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

71. Id. at 3268.

72. Id. at 3256 (White, J., writing for the majority).
73. See, supra, note 35 and accompanying text.
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as relevant under some circumstances but not others.74 The fact that
mental retardation may be deemed irrelevant in some, legislative
classifications is enough to warrant intermediate scrutiny given the
history of discrimination mentally retarded persons have suffered.7 5
The Court's majority maintains that positive legislative response
for the mentally retarded evidences that a continuing antipathy or
prejudice no longer exists. This contradicts a corresponding need for
intermediate scrutiny, and similarly negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless. 6 However, Justice Marshall
points out that the Court has never suggested that other classifications, such as race, became any less suspect once extensive legislation
had been enacted on the subject. 7 Justice Marshall asserts that:
For the retarded, just as for Negroes and women, much has changed
in' recent years, but much remains the same; out-dated statutes are
still on the books 8 and irrational fears or ignorance, traceable to

74. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3270 (Marshall, J., with whom Brennan
and Blackmun, J.J., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (the status of being an undocumented alien is not
an unconstitutional irrelevancy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (stated
that gender frequently bears no relation to legitimate legislative aims, but did not
deem gender an impermissible basis of state action in all circumstances); Rokster
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) and Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981), (upholding gender based classifications); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 70
(Brennan, J., concurring) (Permissible distinctions between persons must bear a rational relationship to their relevant characteristics).
75. City of Cleburne 105 S. Ct. at 3270 (Marshall, J., with Brennan and
Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 3256-57. But see, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973)
("fo]ver the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to
sex-based classifications [citations omitted]. Thus, Congress itself has concluded that
classifications based on sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of government is not without significance to the question presently under
consideration").
77. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3269 (Marshall, J., with Brennan and
Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "[Wlhen judicial action
has catalyzed legislative change, that change certainly does not eviscerate the underlying
Constitutional principle. The Court, for example, has never suggested that race-based
classifications became any less suspect once extensive legislation had been enacted
in the subject." Id. (citation omitted).
78. See Linn and Bowers, The Historical Fallacies Behind Legal Prohibitions
Involving Mentally Retarded Persons-The Eternal Child Grows Up, 13 GoNZAGA
L. REv. 625, 649 (1978) ("The President's Committee on Mental Retardation, in
its first report to the President in 1967, indicated that no state adequately reflects
in its laws what we know of the mentally retarded today. Outmoded classifications
50 or more years old are in common legal use") (citations omitted) ("[S]tatutes prohibiting marriages involving 'imbeciles,' 'morons,' and 'the feeble minded' serve as
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the prolonged social and cultural isolation of the retarded, continue
to stymie the recognition of the dignity and individuality of retarded people.9

Therefore, despite increasing legislation, an express heightened scrutiny
is required, given the increasing recognition of the barriers that con-

front both mentally retarded persons and principles of equality under

the fourteenth amendment.8 0
Misconceptions about mental retardation that lead to mistreatment are still prevalent and may not be immediately removed simply
by legislation. This is exemplified by the phenomenon that former
technical terms for various degrees of retardation, e.g., "idiots," "imbeciles," and "morons" have become commonplace terms of derision."' In fact even the term "mentally retarded" has become a common term of derision.
United States public schools universally denied the mentally

retarded access until the 1970s. 8 The retarded have been segregated

in remote, stigmatizing institutions,8 3 and have faced extinction enconstant reminders of policies of exclusion, segregation, and deprivation, based upon
levels of intelligence"). Id. at 672 (author's footnote).
79. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3269 (Marshall, J., with Brennan and
Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id.
81. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 197. See supra, note 4, table 1.
82. Id. at 197. See also, Linn and Bowers, supra note 78 at 627 ("Society's
treatment of the mentally retarded prior to the year 1800, has been described as
one of the 'most pathetic chapters in the history of man.' However, it is also difficult to attach any but the most uncomplimentary of adjectives to the subsequent
treatment of the mentally retarded in the United States") (citing Dunn, A Historical
Review of the Treatment of the Retarded, in MENTAL RETARDATION 13, 14 (J. Rothstein 2d ed. 1965)).
In the past, even the judiciary reflected false stereotyping and stigmatization
of mentally retarded persons. Justice Holmes wrote:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices,
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. .

.

.[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (A Virginia statute providing for the sexual
sterilization of inmates of institutions supported by the State who were afflicted with
hereditary forms of insanity or imbecility was held not to be in violation of the
equal protection clause).
83. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266-67 (Marshall, J. with Brennan and
Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "A regime of state man-
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-tirely through euthanasia and compulsory sterilization.8" They have
confronted criminal penalties for marriage, have been disqualified
from voting and have been denied citizenship.8 6 Indeed, the mentally
retarded have been subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque treatment.
The second criticism of the Court's majority opinion is that it
is unclear exactly what standard of judicial review was employed, 8 7
dated segregation and degradation soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry
rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive custodial
institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life; the aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded ...

THE

."

City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3267 (citing A.

FEEBLE MINDED IN NEW YoRK

IN AMERICA,

71-104 (1984)).

(1911);

TYOR

&

MOORE,
BELL, CARING FOR THE RETARDED

84. The "science" of eugenics lead "medical authorities and others . . . to
portray the 'feeble minded' as a 'menace to society and civilization . . . responsible

in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social problems."' City of Cleburne,
105 S. Ct. at 3266 (Marshall, J. with Brennan and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in
part and disscenting in part). (citing, H. GODDARD, THE P6SSIBILTIES OF RESEARCH
As APPLIED TO THE PREVENTION OF FEEBLEMINDEDNESS,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-

307 (1915) cited in, A. DEUTSCH,
THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA, 360 (2d ed. 1949). See also, Fernald, The Burden
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION,

of Feeblemindedness, 17 J. PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 87, 90 (1913) (the retarded 'cause
unutterable sorrow at home and are a menace and danger to the community'); L.

M. Terman, Feeble-Minded Children in the Public Schools of California, 5

SCHOOLS

AND SOCIETY 161 (1917) ('only recently have we begun to recognize how serious a
menace (feeble-mindedness) is to the social, economic and moral welfare of the state.
• . .[lit is responsible . . . for the majority of cases of chronic and semi-chronic
pauperism, and for much of our alcoholism, prostitution, and venereal diseases').
Books with titles such as THE MENACE OF THE FEEBLE MINDED INCONNECTICUT (1915),
issued by the Connecticut School for Imbeciles, became commonplace. See, C.
FRAZIER, THE MENACE OF THE FEEBLE-MINDED IN PENNSYLVANIA, (1913); W. FERNALD, THE BURDEN OF THE FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS, (1912) (Mass.); Juvenile Protection

Association of Cincinnati, THE FEEBLE-MINDED, OR THE HUB TO OUR WHEEL OF
VICE, (1915) (Ohio). "The resemblance to such works as, R. SHUFELDT, THE NEGRO:
A MENACE TO AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, (1907), "is striking, and not coincidental").
85. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3267 (Marshall, J. with Brennan and
Blackmun J.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) The court further stated,
"[slegregation was accompanied by eugenic marriage and sterilization laws that

extinguished for the retarded one of the 'basic civil rights of man'-the right to
marry and procreate." (Citing, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942).
"IMlarriages of the retarded were made, and in some states continue to be,
not only voidable but also a criminal offense." City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3267
(footnote and citations omitted).

86. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3267 (citing Note, Mental Disability and
the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979)).

87. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J. with Brennan and

Blackmun J.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) Marshall stated that, "[t]he
Court holds the ordinance invalid on rational basis grounds and disclaims that anything
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and as Justice Marshall stated no guidance was given as to when the
Court's new "rational basis" standard is to be applied in subsequent
cases. 8 Although the Court did not label the standard applied as intermediate or heightened scrutiny, the Cleburne zoning ordinance was
invalidated only after being subjected to exactly the searching examination associated with heightened scrutiny. 89
In its effort to apply the rational basis standard, the Court's
majority reasoned that the City's concerns for fire hazards and serenity
of the neighborhood do not justify singling out the Cleburne group
home to bear the burden when analogous permitted uses appear to
pose similar threats. 9° However, under the traditional and most minimal
version of the rational basis test, the court has stipulated, "reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.""
The Court in City of Cleburne also stated that the "record"
revealed no rational basis for classification of the CLC group home
as a hospital for the feeble-minded which required a special use permit."2 Under the traditional rational basis standard, however, the record
is not critically examined to determine whether policy decisions are
supported by a firm factual foundation. 3
The Court further found it "difficult to believe" that the groups
of mentally retarded individuals who would live at the CLC home
would present any different or special hazards than other similarly
situated groups named in the statute.' But, under the traditional
minimal scrutiny analysis, the legislation is presumptively constituspecial, in the form of heightened scrutiny is taking place. Yet Cleburne's ordinance
surely would be valid under the traditional rational basis test applicable to economic
and commercial regulation." Id.
88. Id. at 3275. The court states that, "[N]o guidance is .

given as to when

the Court's freewheeling, and potentially dangerous, 'rational basis standard' is to
be employed, nor is attention directed to the invidiousness of grouping all retarded
individuals together". Id.
89. Id. at 3264.
90. Id. See supra, notes 22 & 30.
91. Id. (citing, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489; see, A.F.
of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294
U.S. 608 (1935)).
92. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3259 (1985) (White, J. writing for the
majority).
93. Id. at 3264 (Marshall J., with Brennan and Blackmun, J.J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing, Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196
(1983); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-462, 464 (1981);
Fireman v. Chicago, R.I., & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 138-139 (1968)).
94. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257 (White, J., writing for the majority).
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tional; a legislature is not required .to convince the Court that it has

drawn sensible lines, "and a state 'is not required to resort to close
distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with
reference' to its goals."

95

These criticisms generated by Justice Marshall propose that if
the zoning ordinance is to be invalidated for an irrational, prejudicial
classification, it should be pursuant to an intermediate or heightened

standard, instead of the minimal rational basis test used to review

6
economic and social legislation. Justice Marshall maintains that the
suggestion by the majority that the traditional minimal scrutiny test
calls for this type of searching inquiry may create precedent for courts

to subject economic and social legislation to a similar searching "rational basis" review in the future.9" In addition, by failing to articulate
the factors that justify this more searching rational basis scrutiny,
the Court provides no principled approach for determining when this
8
new "rational basis" review is to be applied.'
YV.

IMPLICATIONS

Because the Supreme Court has departed from traditional equal
protection precedents by refusing to recognize the mentally retarded
as a quasi-suspect class and has failed to adequately identify a new
"rational basis" standard of review, at least two issues arise. First,
equal protection analysis may have become further fragmented. Equal

protection analysis would, therefore, be much more difficult for courts
to apply, since there may be yet another standard, not yet clearly

defined, with little guidance as to its proper application. Second, men-

tally retarded persons and other classes of persons who could have
been recognized in the future as victims of unequal prejudicial treat-

95. Id. at 3264-65 (Marshall, J., with Brennan and Blackmun J.J. concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing, Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522, 527 (1959); see, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Metropolis
Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 68-70 (1913)).
96. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (1985) (Marshall, J., with Brennan
J.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Blackmun
and
97. Id. (Justice Marshall asserts that subjecting economic and commercial legislation to this sort of searching inquiry is "a small and regrettable step back toward
the days of Lochner v. New York," Id. at 3265. Professor Gunther asks whether
modern equal protection doctrine might simply be "the modern Justice's garb for
judicially selected value infusions, for Lochnerizing without wearing the occasionally
discredited mantle of substantive due process?" See GUNTHER, supra, note 10, at
591 (footnote omitted).
98. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (1985) (Marshall, J., with Brennan
and Blackmun, J.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ment (or as politically powerless, or as legislatively disabled due to
false stereotypes, or as those who suffer stigmatization based on an
immutable trait acquired through no fault of their own) may find
the progressive judicial treatment of these disadvantaged minorities
stifled. This may occur as a result of a judicial failure to properly
identify the relevant constitutional interests at stake because of a lack
.of an adequate enlightened equal protection analysis. If this is the
case, one can only hope this decision "will not become entrenched
in the law without further consideration.""'
To apply equal protection in a manner that adequately addresses
the constitutional interests of the mentally retarded and other disadvantaged groups, the Court can no longer retain, or must drastically
change, the terminology of the various scrutiny approaches applied
in equal protection analysis. The outward adherence found in the
majority opinion to these now fragmented standards has reached a
point of undesirability; use of these standards is questionable. Perhaps
a balancing model should now be articulated that accurately describes
the analysis applied by the Court in modern equal protection cases.
Continuing to hold fast to terms such as minimal or rational scrutiny,
intermediate or heightened scrutiny, and strict scrutiny, clouds the
Court's actual analysis and keeps the focus of the Court, legislators
and commentators, on esoteric labeling issues such as those presented
in this case; e.g., whether a classification is "suspect" or "quasisuspect," and whether a right is "fundamental" or "important." A
straightforward articulation of the majority's analysis would allow the
Court, legislators and commentators to contribute to the development
of an equal protection analysis that is coherent and consistent in its
application.
This particular plight of the mentally retarded may serve, however,
as a catalyst for the development of Justice Stevens' proposed unitary
standard. This standard would discard the rigid classifications of the
minimum, intermediate and strict scrutiny standards and provide a
new evolving principled approach to subsequent equal protection
challenges. In applying legal concepts of equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment, this approach may eradicate not only stifling prohibitions, such as Cleburne's zoning ordinance, which operate to prejudicially prevent and to deteriorate the attainment of an individual's
capabilities but may eradicate all prejudicial classifications which irrationally preclude individuals from directing their own destinies and
exercising the same constitutional freedoms enjoyed by others.
99. Id. at 3275 (Marshall, J., with Brennan and Blackmun J.J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part).
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The positive thrust of Justice Stevens' approach emphasizes that

individuals may not be legally classified and discriminated against on

the basis of their differences from others unless those differences are
relevant-relevant to afford the individual and other special services
or necessary protection. Individuals may not be classified in a manner
that irrationally stereotypes and denies basic constitutional rights. The
equal protection analysis applied by the Supreme Court must ensure
that not only the mentally retarded but other individuals in classes
subjected to a history of unfair treatment are all regarded with respect
as human beings with dignity and with potential as motivated and
achieving members of society.'°0

VI.

A UNITARY STANDARD

Confusion concerning the labeling of equal protection standards
of review, or confusion concerning the level of judicial review
appropriate for a particular case may be eliminated in the future by
the explanation found in Justice Steven's concurring opinion. To the

extent that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
directs that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike,' 0 '
it may be that particular clearly defined standard of equal protection
review to be applied to a particular legislative classification is becoming less critical.' 0° Justice Stevens' approach suggests that the critical
focus is on the legislative classification itself.

100. See Kaist, Why Equal Protection Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 247-48
(1983). With regard to equality guaranteed in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and elsewhere in the United States Constitution, Kaist stated, "The
equal citizenship principle [is] . . . the presumptive right 'to be treated by the organized
society as a respected, responsible, and participating member."' Id. See also Baker,
Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58
TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1058-59 (1980) "[S]ociety ought to respect the equality of worth
of all its members and ought not condone the subordination of any people."
101. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3254 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982)). See also F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920). The court also stated, "But so too, 'the Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same."' City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3254. (citing Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S.
141, 147 (1940)). See Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949): "The Constitution does not require that things
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. But it does require,
in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated."
(footnotes omitted).
102. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260 (Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
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Justice Stevens points out that equal protection cases have not
actually delineated well-defined judicial standards.' 03 The cases reflect
103. Id. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J. with Burger, C.J. concurring.) Justice Stevens
cited United States Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-177 n.10 (1980).
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); F.S. Royster
Guano Co., v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
and James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). The most arrogant legal scholar
would not claim that all of these cases applied a uniform or consistent test
under equal protection principles.
The Supreme Court has used a wide variety of phrases to describe various standards of judicial review. United States Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[a] challenged classification may be sustained only
if it is rationally related to achievement of an actual legitimate governmental purpose"); Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) ("classifications must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives. . . .") Lalli v. Lalli 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (classifications will be found
"invalid ... if they are not substantially related to permissible state interests. ...");
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (classifications "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives"); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(the legislative classification must serve "overriding or compelling interests that cannot be achieved either by a more carefully tailored legislative classification or by
the use of feasible, less drastic means"); Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 376
(1974) (a valid classification must have "some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to at least one of the stated purposes justifying the different
treatment. . . ."); In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) ("State must show
that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and
that the use of the classification is 'necessary ... to accomplishment' of its purpose
or the safeguarding of its interest") (citations omitted); San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) ("scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulate state purpose. ....);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (classification must have
"significant relationship to those recognized purposes. . . ."); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972) (state must "demonstrate that such laws are necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest"); Living v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) (classification "must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some
permissible state objective. . . ."); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964)
(classification "must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and
just relation to the act in which the classification is proposed. . . ."); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (equal protection standards are "offended only
if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's
objective") Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954) ("classification
[must] rest on real and not feigned differences, that the distinction have some relevance
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a "continuum" of judgmental responses to differing legislative
classifications.' 0 4 In particular, alienage, illegitimacy, gender, age, and
to the purpose for which the classification is made, and that the different treatments
be not so disparate, relative to the difference in the classification, as to be wholly
arbitrary"); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (classification must have "some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of the regulation"); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) ("whether any state of facts either known or which
could reasonably be assumed affords support for [the legislative classification]");
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) ("classification must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. . . ."); Magoun v.

Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 294 (1898) (" 'based upon some reasonable
ground-some difference'which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted
classification.' "). The above cited cases are cited in a similar context in Widin, supra
note 28, at 409-10 n.17.
104. City of Cleburne 105 S. Ct. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens has been a frequent advocate of this position. See, e.g.,
his concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976), beginning, "[tlhere
is only one Equal Protection Clause." Id. Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the
rigid two-tiered formulation has been Justice Marshall. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the
Court's inquiry has "focused upon the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in .the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the state interests asserted in support
of the classification.") (citations omitted); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Supreme
Court's equal protection decisions defy easy categorization, Justice Marshall stated
that the Court "has applied a spectrum of standards . . . [that) clearly comprehends
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending. . . on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is.drawn."); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-521 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (the Court must 'consider the facts and circumstances
behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification."') (citing Kramer v.
Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969), quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30 (1968)). Justice White has also agreed with this point. See, e.g., his
concurring opinion in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973), commenting-that
"it is clear that we employ not just one, or two, but as my Brother Marshall has
so ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards ...

.' "

Id. Professor J. Harvie

Wilkinson has proposed a balancing approach to intermediate level review of statutes
which deny equality of opportunity to groups of persons. Wilkinson, supra note 32,
at 945. Wilkinson's approach closely resembles the balancing that Justice Marshall
has consistently advocated. Under Wilkinson's model, the Court would weigh and
balance these elements: "(1) the importance of the opportunity being unequally burdened or denied; (2) the strength of the state interest served in denying it; and (3)
the character of the groups whose opportunities are denied." Id. at 991.
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mental retardation do not fit into well defined classifications.", Justice
Stevens asserts that the three levels of scrutiny used in equal protection analysis, "[do] not describe a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion"'' 6 (emphasis added). This unitary standard, Stevens
argues, adequately explains all so-called levels of equal protection
analysis and may be applied to all challenges concerning legislative
07

classifications.'

Justice Stevens asserts that the Court must ask three questions
in the application of the unitary standard.' 0 First, "[w]hat class is
harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 'tradition
of disfavor' by our laws?"' 0 9 Second, "[w]hat is the public purpose
that is being served by the law?"" ' Third, "[w]hat is the characteristic
of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment?""'
Justice Stevens contends that the answers to these three questions will
result in virtually automatic invalidation of racial classifications, the

validation of most economic classifications, and differing results in
cases involving classifications based on alienage, ' 2 gender, '" and il105. City of Cleburne 105 S. Ct. at 3261.
106. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
107. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261 (Stevens, J., with Burger, C. J., concurring). This unitary standard may be analogous to that found in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, (1976), which set forth three balancing factors in the area
of substantive due process analysis.
108. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261-62 (Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
109. Id. at 3261.
110. Id. at 3261-62.
111. Id. at 3262.
112. For differing results in cases involving classifications based on alienage,
see Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-80 (1976) (the Court held that Congress may
condition an aliens eligibility for participation in a federal program on admission
for permanent residence and continuous residence in the United States for five years);
compare, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (the Court held invalid a New
York law providing that only American citizens may hold permanent positions in
the competitive classified civil service), and, In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(the Court held invalid Connecticut's exclusion of resident aliens from admission
to the state bar and the practice of law) with, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68
(1979) (the Court held a state may refuse to employ as elementary and secondary
school teachers aliens who are eligible for citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization), and Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (the Court held a state may bar
the employment of aliens as state troopers).
113. For differing results in cases involving classifications based on gender, compare, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (the Court held that a state's preference
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legitimacy. "I'
Arguably, the answers to those questions will provide differing
results in cases involving classifications based on mental retardation
as well. These results will not occur because an intermediate or
heightened standard is applied but because characteristics of the disadvantaged class may sometimes be relevant and sometimes irrelevant
to the purpose that the challenged laws purportedly intend to serve." 5
For example, Justice Stevens proposed that an impartial law

maker, or even a rational member of a class of persons defined as

mentally retarded,' 16 could vote in favor of a law providing funds
for special education and other special treatment for the mentally
retarded."' At the same time they may both recognize that a member
of that class may need special supervisibn or restrictions for the protection of himself and others (such as in the operation of certain hazar-

dous equipment) even though this may deprive a member of the class

of employment opportunities enjoyed by other citizens." '
In answer to the first of Justice Stevens' proposed questions, in
City of Cleburne, the class harmed by the legislation was comprised

for men over women in the appointment of administrators of estates may not be
mandated solely on the basis of sex), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(the Court set aside a gender-based distinction in a federal benefits program under
which survivors benefits based on earnings of a deceased husband were payable to
his widow, but benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife were payable
to a widower only if he were receiving at least one half of his support from his
deceased wife), with, Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
(the Court upheld a Massachusetts law granting absolute lifetime preference to veterans
for state civil service positions, even though the preference operated overwhelmingly
to the advantage of males), and Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (the Court
upheld a provision pertaining to Social Security spousal benefits).
114. For differing results in cases involving classifications based upon illegitimacy,
compare, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (the Court upheld a New York statute
'which required that the paternity of the father be determined in a judicial proceeding
prior to the father's death in order for illegitimate children to claim under his estate),
with, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (the Court struck down a provision
in an Illinois statute governing intestate succession which allowed illegitimate children
to inherit from their fathers by intestate succession only if the child had been
legitimized by marriage of the parents).
Justice Stevens cited to the above cases in notes 112-114 supra. City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3261-62 (1985).
115. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3262 (1985) (Stevens, J. with Burger, C.
J., concurring).
116. Id. This is the first time a member of the Court has suggested that "what
a rational member of the disadvantaged class could approve of" may be taken into
consideration in-equal protection analysis.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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of mentally retarded individuals who were to be residents at the CLC
group home. The mentally retarded have certainly been subjected to
a tradition of disfavor by our laws." 9 In answer to the second of
the questions, the public purpose that this legislation was purportedly
intended to serve was to meet the concerns of the neighboring property owners, which the Court rejected as an irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded.' 0 In answer to the third question, the relevant
characteristics of the disadvantaged class that justify disparate treatment in this situation were unclear at best, given the analogous uses
which were permitted under the ordinance.' 2 ' Under the unitary standard, the Cleburne legislation would be unconstitutional. An impartial lawmaker could not logically believe that Cleburne's zoning ordinance would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the
harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.' 22
VII.

CONCLUsMON

The majority opinion in City of Cleburne has been called "potentially dangerous"' 2 3 to the future of the mentally retarded and other
disadvantaged minorities. The decision in this case may prove to be
a judicial "stumble" that will adversely affect the lives of many for
years to come. One attempt at resolving these questions concerning
current equal protection analysis may be found in Justice Stevens'
-concurring opinion.
Justice Stevens' proposed unitary standard has left many practical considerations as to its future application unanswered, such as:
How will burden of proof be determined? Must the public concerns
be legitimate? However, this approach may, nevertheless, be a positive
step for equal protection analysis. Its further development may shift
the focus of the Court's attention from the particular label given an
equal protection analysis to the recognition of important constitutional
interests and invidious legislative classifications.
The two most important results of City of Cleburne are first,
that mentally retarded persons were allowed access to a community
119. Id. See supra notes 57, 58, 78, 81-85 and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 3260 (White, J., writing for the majority) and 3262-63 (Stevens J.,
with Burger, C.J., concurring).
121. See supra notes 38 and 46 and accompanying text.
122. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3262-63 (1985) (Stevens J., with Burger,
C.J., concurring).
123. Id. at 3275 (Marshall, J.with Brennan and Blackmun, J.J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("No guidance is ... given as to when the Court's
freewheeling, and potentially dangerous, 'rational basis standard' is to be
employed.... ")
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on an equal footing with other similarly situated people, and second,
that equal protection analysis may be viewed critically by the judiciary
from a developmental standpoint for years to come. Decisions such
as this one are critical to future constitutional -advances of groups
of people who have suffered historically from discrimination.
GARRICK

J.

HODGE

